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STATE LIABILITY: CASES (ECONOMIC ANALYSIS) 
 
We will make an attempt to address the cases from the perspective of economic analysis. 
However, it should be stated from the outset that this may not always be possible since not all 
variables necessary for an adequate economic analysis may be present; moreover, to some 
extent the analysis also depends on how one weighs the advantages and disadvantages of 
public authority liability as they were discussed above. We will try to relate the cases to some 
of the literature discussed in the general report.  
 
Wrongfully cancelled licence 
 
As we explained above, there may be an economic argument for such a multi-task agent (like 
C) to limit his liability to gross negligence. C is undoubtedly a multi-task agent since he has to 
balance two different types of external costs: the costs to the public at large of abusing old 
people versus the cost of having his activity prohibited. Given the uncertainties concerning 
this multi-task activity there is reason for a higher threshold of liability under negligence and 
hence to limit negligence to cases of gross negligence.  
 
There could be personal liability of the grossly negligent agent C, but probably this will 
barely be efficient since C may have limited assets and thus not be able to compensate for the 
(potentially huge) damage. A strong case can be made in this case for vicarious liability of 
state agency B: state agency B can be considered as a superior risk-bearer and allocating the 
liability primarily to state agency B may have the advantage that it will more diligently 
control the behaviour of official C. Liability of state agency B could e.g. lead to an 
improvement of its decision-making (e.g. better guidelines, better supervision by a 
hierarchical superior officer etc.), as a result of which the grossly negligent behaviour of C (or 
his colleagues) could be prevented in the future.  
 
 
Negligent safety inspection 
 
We have explicitly discussed the case of supervisor liability. We have concluded that the case 
for excluding liability towards third parties (even for small mistakes) is quite weak. The 
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question that can be asked is to what extent H in this particular case can be considered as a 
multi-task agent which had room for discretion. Obviously H has various tasks and probably 
limited time and resources and thus will execute random safety checks to control the safety of 
boats. However, the case mentions that H should have identified that the hull of the boat is 
structurally unsound. This could lead to the conclusion that H is grossly negligent which 
could lead to his liability and, more importantly, to the vicarious liability of G, the state 
agency responsible for H. As we have argued under Case I, it may make more sense to impose 
vicarious liability on G instead of liability on H. If any case for immunity would have to be 
made, there could be an immunity of H, but certainly not of G. J should therefore be able to 
recover from state agency G and (depending on whether one accepts immunity for H or not) 
from H as well. 
 
The case for liability towards the supervisee (I) would be especially strong if H acted grossly 
negligent.  Also, the fact that it was not reasonably discoverable for I that the hull of the boat 
was structurally unsound, shows that there was no issue of moral hazard, which makes the 
case for state liability stronger.  
 
 
Missing (stop) sign 
 
A first question would be whether the behaviour of F, the responsible public authority, would 
have to be considered as negligent (perhaps grossly so). An argument in favour of that (and 
hence of liability) would be that there was a lapse of several months and the knowledge 
(which the authority admitted) that the section of the cycle path was potentially dangerous. 
Being aware of the dangerous character (that’s why there was probably a warning in the first 
place) the failure to take action, knowing the potentially dangerous character of the local 
situation could make the behaviour of authority F (grossly) negligent. Framing this in terms of 
the Learned Hand formula: the prevention costs were probably much smaller than the 
expected reduction in harm if prevention was taken.  
 
However, a second aspect to consider is the behaviour of the victim E. Liability of the 
responsible authority F could lead to a moral hazard on the side of E, the victim, who gets a 
full public insurance, paid by the taxpayer, which may dilute the incentives of E to take care 
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as well.
1
 Little is known on optimal preventive measures that E could have taken. From the 
description it appears that neither cyclist is able to see the other until the last moment because 
of a wall at the side of the cycle path. If that is the case it is a potentially dangerous situation 
which would call for a particular careful behaviour on the side of E as well. A full liability of 
F without taking into account E’s behaviour may therefore dilute the incentives of E to take 
care. The liability of F (for being grossly negligent in the failure to repaint) should therefore 
be mitigated with a contributory or comparative negligence rule to provide incentives for care 
to E as well.
2
 
 
 
Fireworks store 
 
Y is clearly a multi-task agent which has room for discretion. Y has various tasks and limited 
time and resources and will thus execute random safety checks. Unless in the specific case 
there was no room for discretion (e.g. there was a rule that specifies precise actions which 
were not taken), or Y made a policy choice that no reasonable person would ever take (e.g. it 
had accurate information that an explosion was imminent but Y did not act), it should not be 
held liable. Even when one would conclude that Y is liable, it should not be held (fully) liable 
for the harm suffered by X because of moral hazard reasons.
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Unpasteurized cheese 
 
As stated before, when a public body makes a policy choice –whether it is an act or an 
omission - that no reasonable person would ever make, there should be no immunity. It was 
clearly unreasonable not to lift the ban, so the state should be held negligent.  
 
 
Police cross-fire 
 
                                                 
1
 Dari-Mattiacci, Garoupa and Gomez-Pomar, 19. 
2
 We do not discuss here the differences between comparative and contributory negligence as far as providing 
efficient incentives for care to the victim is concerned.  
3
 And possibly not for the harm suffered by Z (at least if Z knew about the potentially dangerous situation).  
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Given that P reasonably concluded that he must fire back, if liability were to be found in this 
particular case, it would amount to a strict liability. The case for liability may be weak. For 
multi-task agents (like police officers) strict liability can lead to overprecaution (here: police 
officers may be too hesitant to fire back, or may get instructions to be overly prudent).  Next 
one could argue that the state is a superior risk bearer compared to the victim of the shooting. 
However, the fact that insurance is usually available may significantly weaken this argument. 
Furthermore, state liability as a compensation mechanism may be far too costly given high 
litigation costs of the tort system. If compensation is the goal to be achieved, this can better be 
realised via alternatives such as (state provided) insurance or a public compensation 
mechanism. The transaction costs of those mechanisms may be lower than a costly liability 
system for lawful conduct. 
 
 
 
